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Let me begin with an anecdote: One day, an earnest young yeshiva bucher, an aspiring 
Torah scholar, interrupted the rabbi who was studying intensely. “Rebbe, why should you 
spell ‘shalom’ with an aleph?” The rabbi replied, “Don’t bother me with your nonsense. 
You shouldn’t spell ‘shalom’ with an aleph.” But the student persisted, “Then why 
shouldn’t you spell ‘shalom’ with an aleph?” The exasperated rabbi shrugged, “Nu, why 
should you spell ‘shalom’ with an aleph”—to which the student shouted, “But that was 
my question!” 
 I offer this anecdote because it reveals something important about why-questions, 
and Professor Blair has raised just such a question: Why isn’t Philosophy of Argument a 
recognized and established subfield of philosophy? It is worth a brief digression to 
rehearse the logic of why-questions in order to appreciate what Blair has actually done 
here. Otherwise, it might appear that he has merely argued for the importance and 
legitimacy of philosophical investigations of exactly the sort that all of us are already 
engaged in. Everyone here is already on board. This is not a case of preaching to the 





Whenever we ask why something is so, we make two assumptions and assume three 
responsibilities. First, we assume that the target explanans is indeed so. Second, we 
assume that the target explanans is something that is in need of an explanandum. We do 
not ask, for example, why the sky is green. Neither do we ask why three is greater than 
two or why Canada did not invade Portugal yesterday. Ever since Galileo taught us to ask 
why objects in motion come to rest, we no longer ask Aristotle’s question as to why 
objects in motion sometimes stay in motion. That is the norm. Only departures from the 
natural state—rest for Aristotle, but continued motion or rest for Galileo—need 
explanation. Of course, to ask that new question, Galileo had to redraw the boundaries of 
physics and overhaul much of the discipline. The difference between natural and 
constrained motion had to go, but so too did the continuity between efficient and final 
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causation. The irony is that the path to Newton’s elegant solution to the difficult problems 
of periodic pendular motion and parabolic projectile motion required a detour through 
apparently unrelated problems like free-fall and elliptic planetary motion. Sometimes 
things have to get more complicated before they can get simpler. 
 The three responsibilities of would-be explainers are, first, to establish the 
facticity of the explanans, should anyone choose to question or deny it; second, to justify 
the need for an explanation, should anyone challenge that; and finally, to provide a 
satisfactory explanation. The third responsibility is by far the largest because it may 
include several parts, like arguing for the veracity of the proposed explanation, or at least 
arguing for its adequacy, or maybe just arguing for its superiority vis à vis any rival 
explanations out there. The third responsibility is also the most prominent because it is 
what typically occupies most of an explainer’s efforts and attracts the most attention. 
That may be the case here, but Blair’s signal contribution is at the more important but 
often-overlooked second stage. He has brought the question of what does and does not 
need explaining to the foreground. What I would like to do for a moment is play Aristotle 
to Blair’s Galileo and Newton.  
 
3. ARGUMENT IS NOT A NATURAL KIND 
 
The rabbi in the story above heard the student’s question—“Why should we spell 
‘shalom’ with an aleph?”—as resting on the assumption that we should indeed spell 
‘shalom’ that way, but his own utterance of a word-for-word identical question—“Why 
should we spell ‘shalom’ with an aleph?”—rejects that assumption. It is with that second 
kind of reading that I want to respond to Blair’s explanation of why there should be a 
philosophy of argument with the contrary, but word-for-word identical question, “Why 
should there be a philosophy of argument?”  
 After insightfully identifying relevant constitutive criteria for subfields in 
philosophy and noting that the philosophy of argument would satisfy them all, Blair 
tempers any urge we might have to embrace the philosophy of argument with several 
counterarguments against its claims to existence as a legitimate subfield in it own right. It 
already exists under the guise of informal logic. It is part of philosophy of logic. Or 
maybe it is the wrong sort of practice to sustain the right kind of integrated sub-
discipline.  
 Here is where my inner Aristotle chimes in: What’s missing is a single telos for 
arguments. Argumentation theory is a gerrymandered district with bits and pieces from 
logic and epistemology and linguistics and even sociology, ethics, psychology, and 
criticism. Not all reasoning is arguing; not all proofs are arguments; and not all difference 
resolution is argumentation. Sometimes even arguments are not really arguments. The 
best argument against the philosophy of argument is that arguments do not constitute a 
single natural kind. 
 This objection arises because of a crucial gap between the reasons Blair offers in 
support of the philosophy of argument and the reasons he offers for hesitation. The 
positive reasons involve approaching the complex subject of argument from a variety of 
different perspectives, focusing on different aspects of arguments: their nature, norms, 
relations, goals, and foundations. The key point to keep in mind is that these diverse 
approaches converge. The questions and perspectives are related. As with the philosophy 
of law or the philosophy of religion, there is an overarching unity to the subfields. We 
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might say, borrowing terminology from Thomas Kuhn, that there are disciplinary 
paradigms informing them. Now, by this standard, philosophy itself does not qualify as a 
discipline: ethics, logic, metaphysics, political philosophy, et al. are just too diverse a 
collection of discourses for any single paradigm to cover them all. And yet, 
paradoxically, many of philosophy’s subfields do qualify. The philosophy of education, 
the philosophy of language, and the philosophy of science are all more disciplined than 
philosophy in general. Each has a measure of unity that the whole lacks. But—and here’s 
the kicker—that unity is not the unity of a found natural kind. Rather, it is an emergent 
unity that is partly constituted by the existence of that constructed complexity. We might 
say, in Scotistic terms, that it is a real, less than numerical unity but more than a merely 
formal unity. 
 Here is where Blair’s Galileo has to step up and redraw the boundaries of 
argumentation theory to include greater diversity in the service of creating greater unity. I 
am suggesting that, just as for Newton, the pathway to simplicity and unity may well 
travel through complexity and multiplicity. In order to see how the varied questions 
converge and the different perspectives relate, it might be necessary to raise yet more 
questions and approach arguments from yet additional perspectives. To answer our 
questions about how we should argue, maybe we also need to ask why we should argue; 
to get conceptual clarity about what an argument is, it might help to juxtapose that 
question with when and where we should argue—and when and where we should not; 
perhaps insights into the normative principles for arguing well can be found among the 
normative principles for arguing at all: what should we argue about and with whom 




The diversity of questions—of the kinds of questions—that can be asked about arguments 
is staggering. There are ethical, epistemological, aesthetic, and psychological approaches 
to argument, as well as logical, dialectical, and rhetorical ones. And yet, they are more 
that just tangentially related. They can be followed until they converge, or until they are 
made to converge, and I am confident that the critical mass that results can indeed sustain 
the philosophy of argument. 
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